

# Sincerity, Autonomy and their Decline

Somogy Varga

In order to understand the emergence and the impact of the ideal of authenticity, as well as the normative grip it still has on Western societies, we need to take a closer look on the context in which it evolved. The article will try to show how the ideal of authenticity emerges as an antidote to the moral ideals of sincerity and autonomy, and how it replaces them. Another major aim will be to contribute to a more profound understanding of authenticity through defining it in contrast to sincerity and autonomy.

The appeal of the ideal of authenticity can be explained as growing out of a long tradition of Western thought and practices that have shaped the modern worldview substantially. As its long philosophical record and innumerable connotations make authenticity a difficult concept to handle, I will in the context of this article not attempt a comprehensive review of its history. However, it is at one and the same time only by gaining some insight into the historical scaffolding of ideas from which the ideal of authenticity has emerged that we can properly assess the central features of this distinctively modern cultural outlook. Consequently, I will attempt to mark out the sense of authenticity as it is understood today by contrasting it to other related ideals like *sincerity* and *autonomy*, allowing me to provide a proper historical foundation while limiting and systematizing my general approach.

## **"Know thyself"**

One could argue that the idea of authenticity has always been part of Western thought. Socrates must have had a distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic in mind when he invoked the dictum "Know thyself". Similarly, both Augustine's and Seneca's work presuppose this distinction. At first sight, something inner, which is believed to be somehow more truthful and "higher", is contrasted with something outer that is believed to be false. However, before concluding that authenticity has played a central role from the beginning of Western thought, we have to pay attention to the conception of the self in question. To take the example of Seneca, the Stoics did not find joy in the self, but, as

Seneca says, "in the best part of the self". And the best part of the self is ultimately a transcendent self. Seneca does not find joy just in Seneca, but by transcending Seneca, by discovering that he has a reason in himself, which is a part of the universal reason and cosmos.<sup>1</sup>

Similarly, Martha Nussbaum points out that in Stoic spiritual exercises the emphasis lies on the connection between the cultivation of the "inner" and the exercise of "outer" reason.<sup>2</sup> In the same vein, in the case of Socrates, authentic self-knowledge was not really a matter of turning inward to detect unique personal traits, simply because Socrates did not operate with the conception of the self as possessing a personal "interiority" shut off from the rest of creation. Instead, human beings were regarded as parts of a cosmic web of interrelatedness, their individuality understood as determined by the relation it has to this wider whole. According to such a world-view, self-knowledge and authenticity is not about interiority, but about "excising what is particular and distinctive in yourself in order to be better able to match the ideal that determines your function."<sup>3</sup> Hence personal desires and feelings are not only considered irrelevant in determining what one really is; they may even be discarded as burdens that endanger authenticity. In this sense, authenticity can be viewed as the ideal of living up to the place one has in the scheme of things. That is, living up to the position that defines one as an instance of humankind.

Clearly, Augustine deepens the gap between interiority and exteriority, creating a more profound notion of interiority that, according to Richard Sennett, has shaped Western culture ever since. Augustine thus creates a "divide between subjective experience and worldly experience, self and city"<sup>4</sup> and puts his faith in the triumph of an inner spiritual world over a worldly outer that turns us away from ourselves.<sup>5</sup> Augustine's advice on an authentic life is: "Do not go outward; return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth."<sup>6</sup> In Book 10 of his *Confessions* (1955), he uses the symbol of the heart

---

<sup>1</sup> Pierre Hadot, "Reflections on the notion of the 'cultivation of the self'", in: Timothy J. Armstrong (ed.), *Michel Foucault, Philosopher* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 225-232

<sup>2</sup> See Martha Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)

<sup>3</sup> Charles Guignon, *On Being Authentic* (London: Routledge, 2004), 8

<sup>4</sup> Richard Sennett, *The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), xii

<sup>5</sup> Richard Sennett, *Conscience of the Eye*, 6-10

<sup>6</sup> *De vera Religione*, XXXIX. 72, quoted in Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 129

as a way of expressing the inner self,<sup>7</sup> with the vocabulary of the heart suggesting not only a journey towards interiority. Instead, for Augustine interiority is where God dwells, and it is in this interior space that one is truly united with humanity.<sup>8</sup> Hence Augustine's pledge to "Return to your heart!" in the *Tractates on the Gospel of John* (18.10) should not be understood as merely an inward journey, but one that eventually transcends this interiority towards God and humanity. Consequently, Augustine clears the path towards the modern duality of outer "false" self and inner "true" self. Yet the inward orientation turns out to be an orientation that exactly transcends interiority. This then shows us how different Augustine's conception of the self is compared to the modern and contemporary conceptions of authenticity. The self is not seen as a unified source of agency but as dependent on God as the source of one's being. This is why the inaugurated distinction between a true and a false self really refers to the worldly, willing self, which only *appears* to be the source of our actions, since God is the real source of our actions. Beyond moving closer to the hidden force, introspection will always remain unreliable and incomplete, since "there is something of man that the spirit of man that is in him does not know."<sup>9</sup> So in a way, we can maintain that authenticity has been a part of Western thought since antiquity. But only if we remember how much the Greek, Roman and early Christian views on the authentic self differ from our modern and contemporary conception of authenticity and self as a unified source of agency. Much later, and partly due to the rapidly growing secularization, the idea behind the ancient dictums "Know Thyself" and "Return to your heart" is transformed together with the underlying conception of the self. The emergence of the moral ideal of sincerity, under the dictum of "Be true to yourself", marks a crucial step towards the contemporary idea of authenticity.

### Sincerity

In his book *Sincerity and Authenticity* (1972), Lionel Trilling traces the emergence of a new moral idea, putting forward "that at a certain point in its history the moral life of Europe added to itself a new element, the state or quality of the self which we call sincerity."<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> Augustine, *Confessions and Enchiridion*, ed. Albert Outler (*The Library of Christian Classics*, London: SCM Press, 1955) Book 10, section 3 and 4

<sup>8</sup> Philip F. Sheldrake, "Christian Spirituality as a Way of Living Publicly: A Dialectic of the Mystical and Prophetic", *Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality* 3.1 (2003) 19-37

<sup>9</sup> Augustine, *Confessions* Book 10, section v

<sup>10</sup> Lionel Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 2

Trilling points here to a moment in Hamlet where Polonius is sending Laertes on his way to Paris with paternal advice:

This above all: to thine own self be true  
And it doth follow, as the night the day,  
Thou canst not then be false to any man.<sup>11</sup>

Polonius thus conceived of sincerity as being true to 'thine own self', which at first sounds a lot like the contemporary ideal of authenticity. However, a careful look reveals that this actually corresponds with the model of "inward and upward" movement that we have seen in Augustine. Also, as in the Greek and Roman thinkers, being true to one's own self is not thought of as an end in itself, but first and foremost as an essential condition of virtue. Thus inward orientation is not valuable in its own right - it is legitimate because it serves the higher moral goal of *thereby* being true to others. This should make clear that the underlying idea of the true self is very different to the contemporary ideal: sincerity is essentially not a personal, but a social virtue: its aim is avoiding being false to others by virtue of being true to one's own self. If we look at the defining properties of sincerity, we see a particular pattern emerging. Sincerity is defined as the state of the self in which there is congruence between avowal and actual feeling, which means that sincerity is about the correspondence between what is affirmed and the actual conduct. Hence sincerity refers to the self in its outward manifestation in the social domain, and thus it can be put to the test from a third person perspective: one can always examine whether outward actions actually match public declarations. Sincere in this sense means something close to 'honest.' The basic wrongdoing of *insincerity* was about violating the expectations that followed with the position one held in society, whenever attempting to appear otherwise than one ought to.

Trilling shows how, with the evolving of modernity, the moral ideal of sincerity transformed into the ideal of authenticity. Strikingly, compared to sincerity, both the way in which authenticity was to be theoretically defensible and the defining features of what is thought to be authentic, changes completely. In fact, there is a complete reversal of the defining features of authenticity: the sincere person who seeks to match the requirements

---

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 3

of his position in social life is now automatically considered inauthentic.<sup>12</sup> Sartre discusses at length the inauthentic waiter who disappears as an individual while trying to fill out his role his role as a waiter.<sup>13</sup> When turning to the question of theoretical underpinnings, we see an analogous reversal: being true to one's own self is no longer a mere means to a higher moral end, but an end in itself. As Ferrara notes, authenticity is sincerity for its own sake.<sup>14</sup> Also, while sincerity implies no criticism of a given social order, authenticity becomes an implicitly critical concept, which can call into question social order and public opinion. Hegel is among the first to point out the fading away of the ideal of sincerity, by polemically calling it "the heroism of dumb service."<sup>15</sup> Hegel launches an attack on the sincerity of the bourgeois "honest man," who passively interiorizes a conventional social ethos. In the condition of sincerity, the individual might be obedient to the external power of society, a conformity that for Hegel leads to subjugation and a deterioration of the individual. Via the progress of spirit, the individual consciousness has to move from this condition to a condition of baseness in which the individual becomes antagonistic to external power in which the individual achieves a measure of autonomy. The loss of this transparency also means that the individual becomes 'alienated' from himself or herself. Yet this is a necessary step in progress.

As Bernard Williams has noted, it is "a self-consciousness which can no longer feel unreflectively at home in its social environment."<sup>16</sup> Hegel shows this clearly in the passage that comments on Diderot's *Rameau's Nephew*, a story in which the narrator persona (supposedly Diderot himself) is portrayed as the reasonable, sincere man who respects the prevailing order and who has achieved bourgeois respectability. The nephew is full of contempt for the society in which he figures as a worthless person. But he is in opposition to himself, because he is still aspiring to a better standing in a society which he disapproves and which he believes has nothing but emptiness to offer.<sup>17</sup> For Hegel, Diderot is an example of the sincere, honest soul. The nephew, on the other hand, figures as the "disintegrated," alienated consciousness. He is clearly not motivated by societal powers like social esteem or wealth, and is (therefore) alienated, but for Hegel

---

<sup>12</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *Modernity and Authenticity: A Study of the Social and Ethical Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Albany, NY: Sunny Press, 1993), 87

<sup>13</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel E. Barnes, trans. (New York: Washington Square, [1943] 1966), 101-103

<sup>14</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *Modernity and Authenticity*, 86

<sup>15</sup> Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (London: Routledge, 2002), Vol. 2, 515

<sup>16</sup> Bernard Williams, *Truth and Truthfulness*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002), 190

<sup>17</sup> Michel Despland, "Can Conscience Be Hypocritical? The Contrasting Analyses of Kant and Hegel", *The Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 68, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1975), 357-370: 360

this alienation is a step in the progression towards autonomous existence. With Hegel, we see an intellectual atmosphere emerging in which sincerity becomes suspicious and in which it later will be replaced by the stronger ideal of authenticity. Trilling condenses the "becoming suspicious" of this idea: in his words, it becomes clear that society "requires of us that we present ourselves as being sincere, and the most efficacious way of satisfying this demand is to see to it that we really are sincere, that we really are what we want our community to know we are." And Trilling continues: "In short, we play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part of the sincere person, with the result that a judgment may be passed upon our sincerity that it is not authentic."<sup>18</sup>

This becoming suspicious of the ideal of sincerity is one of the factors that have made possible the emergence of the ideal of authenticity as we now know it. Yet one more decisive factor was the emergence of the modern concept of inwardness. Authenticity distinguishes itself from sincerity by being founded upon a distinctively modern conception of the self, a notion of self that relies on a break of interiority and exteriority far more pronounced than the ones we have seen in earlier thinkers. One of the intertwining processes that have led to such a radicalization was the emergence of *religious individualism*, stressing the importance of inwardness, intentions and conscience. In *The History of Sexuality (1980)*, Michel Foucault traces the origins of the modern subject of inwardness, suggesting that "Western societies have established the confession as one of the main rituals we rely on for the production of truth. (...) The obligation to confess now relayed through so many different points, is so deeply ingrained in us that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, 'demands' only to surface."<sup>19</sup> For Foucault, confession - the desire to monitor one's interior life and to tell certain "truths" about oneself - has become a part of everyday life, reaching from religious contexts to therapy. The radicalization of the distinction between true interiority and exteriority has led to new possibilities: inner states, motivation and feelings can now be objectified as something that can be worked on in different contexts. But also, the focus on the inner opens the way for assessing one's external and worldly undertakings against the measure of who one essentially is.

---

<sup>18</sup> Trilling, *Sincerity and Authenticity*, 10-11

<sup>19</sup> Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction*. (New York: Vintage Books 1980) (Transl. Robert Hurley), 58-60

## Autonomy

As I have mentioned earlier, understanding the emergence of the ethical ideal of authenticity can best be located by describing the context in which it evolves as a contrast to sincerity and autonomy. We have seen that the normative grip of authenticity is partly explainable as building upon and replacing sincerity. Now the connection of authenticity and autonomy is more sophisticated and even today we find numerous accounts that do not distinguish the two adequately from each other. Of course, as ethical concepts there are several parallels between authenticity and autonomy: most importantly, they both oppose the pre-modern idea that what is right can be justified by recourse to some higher authority like God or the King, or to some Good, which can be known a priori.<sup>20</sup> Historically, while the two ideals to a large extent shape distinct ethical theories, they share a common origin: ethical views oriented towards autonomy and authenticity both view the normativity of ethical norms as deriving from the capability of the subject to follow a self-imposed principle. Having said this, it is however clear that they are distinct: for Kant, the goodness of a moral will is constituted by its being formed by principles. In other words, it is good and morally worthy if it is exclusively oriented towards the moral law. In opposition to this, from a perspective of an ethics of authenticity, worth is constituted by recognizing (and not denying) the impulses that draw us away from universal principles. Christoph Menke has convincingly shown that Hegel's discussion of tragedy in fact encircles this particular problem of modernity: the modern ideal of authenticity, where the individual pursues a good life that expresses his identity clashes with the idea of normatively construed autonomy.<sup>21</sup> In this sense, modernity is divided with regards to such kinds of orientation, constituting the "Tragödie der Sittlichkeit." Menke interprets modern social reality in the light of this tragic opposition between autonomy and authenticity, between a normative order (that is constructed in prohibitive terms) and individuality.

The idea of autonomy is a legacy of Enlightenment humanism. It emphasizes the individual's self-governing abilities, which a person employs independently of her position in political and social structures. Autonomy is understood as holding a basic moral and political value. Central to this claim is that moral principles and the legitimacy of political authority should be grounded in the self-governing individual set free from

---

<sup>20</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *Modernity and Authenticity*, 89

<sup>21</sup> Christoph Menke, *Tragödie im Sittlichen: Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit nach Hegel*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 93

various cultural and social structures. In this sense, autonomy has two components: being free from paternalistic interventions and the capacity to decide for oneself, or in other words the actor's ability to reliably follow a *self-imposed* principle.<sup>1</sup> As a legacy of Enlightenment, autonomy was given a key role in philosophical accounts of what a person is, what moral responsibility amounts to and how political authority can be theoretically justified. At the core of Kant's moral theory is the argument that explains and justifies the authority of moral requirements, namely that rational human will is autonomous. Like Rousseau, Kant goes beyond the merely 'negative' freedom, thus abandoning the notion of outer constraints: autonomy does not refer to external laws, only to those that are laid down by oneself. Individual autonomy is understood to refer to a life led according to one's own reasons and motives rather than the product of manipulative external forces. In a broad sense, it refers to the ability to put one's own behaviour under reflexive scrutiny, consequently making it dependent on self-determined goals.<sup>2</sup> In this sense, "personal autonomy" is understood as a feature that actors can display when dealing with a very diverse array of aspects of their lives.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, Kantian "moral autonomy" is limited to issues of moral obligation, meaning the capacity to impose the moral law on oneself. In Kantian moral discourse, autonomy is the ideal of self-legislation guided by general principles. Hence the central issue is that autonomy always entails responsiveness to reason. For this to function unconstrained by external factors, it must emerge from the actor herself: her will can be determined through obsessions or determinations that are not responsive to reason.

Now where does authenticity come into the picture? If we apply Weber's typology of action, (Weber distinguishes between instrumentally rational, value-rational, affective and traditional ways in which actions can be oriented) it is clear that only purposive-rational and value-rational action qualify as autonomous conduct. What Weber terms traditional and affective action cannot be so qualified.<sup>4</sup> What the notion of authenticity adds to this picture is that it does not only refer to leading an autonomous life, guided by one's own non-constrained reasons and motives. Beyond this, authenticity also refers to the idea that these motives and reasons are expressive of a subject's core personality.

---

<sup>1</sup> Gerald Dworkin, *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 121-129

<sup>2</sup> Axel Honneth „Schwerpunkt: Autonomie Authentizität“, in: *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Vol. 42, nr. 1 (1994), 59-60: 59

<sup>3</sup> Gerald Dworkin, *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy*, 34-47

<sup>4</sup> Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Ed. By G. Roth and C. Wittich, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1968) 25, 26; also: Ferrara, *Reflective Authenticity*, 5

This points to the conceptual gap between autonomy and authenticity: I can lead an autonomous life, even if this way of life fails to be expressive of the person I understand myself to be. In this sense, the notion of authenticity accounts for something that lies beyond the scope of autonomy, bringing into play the actor's sense of self-identity. I might act self-determined and purposive-rational or value-rational in a case where my concrete undertaken action fails to be authentic, thus to fit with who I take myself to be. It seems to be the case that authentic conduct, expressive of the actor's self, is difficult to be accommodated within the framework of autonomy, since it obviously cannot be reduced to "self-determined" conduct. If we return to Weber's typology, we must note that while he never uses the term "authenticity", his notion of political action comes very close in meaning to such a term. When Weber lets his responsible politician cite Luther's famous words, "Here I stand. I can do no other", he has in mind a way of conduct that incorporates affective, moral and even pragmatic elements: it involves some reflection on agent-transcendent value orientation and deep personal emotional involvedness, expressive of the agent's identity.

On the other hand, while we cannot accommodate a notion of authenticity within the framework of autonomy, it must be emphasized that authenticity is far from being wholly demarcated from autonomy, since it includes and presupposes the notion of autonomy. In an earlier book, Ferrara discusses autonomy and authenticity, saying that authenticity "introduces a distinction between deviations which are bound with essential aspects of a person's identity and, on the other hand, deviations originating in feeling or emotions which occupy a peripheral place in the person's identity."<sup>5</sup> He thus acknowledges a necessary distinction between the core and periphery of personal commitments, wishes, feelings etc., but still wants to hold that sometimes, in order to act authentically, we have to act against the principles of autonomy.<sup>6</sup> This distinction thus shows that authenticity presupposes autonomy: in order for my behaviour to be guided by central and defining elements (that I consider to be mine in a stronger way) of what I take myself to be, I have to be able to reflectively establish what these central elements are. The ability to engage in this captures what is meant by autonomy.<sup>7</sup>

Using Charles Taylor's vocabulary we could say that authenticity is the practice of

---

<sup>5</sup> Alessandro Ferrara, *Modernity and Authenticity*, 90

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 105

<sup>7</sup> Critical to Ferrara: Joel Anderson, "Review Essay: The Persistence of Authenticity", *Philosophy and Social Criticism* Vol. 21, no 1, (1995), 101-109

autonomy within a "language of personal resonance."<sup>8</sup> This means that the right conduct is not directly equated with willingness to abide by universal moral principles, but involves a personal relation *towards* those principles. So as Menke says, the ideal of authenticity does not object to the normative content of the self-given law, but it denies that full freedom consists in making and following such a law.<sup>9</sup> So it is not just about being involved in the origin of such a law, but about how this law fits in with the wholeness of a person's life, and how or whether it expresses who the person is. This person is thus not simply located at the point where action and principles coincide as a new, second level of normativity emerges that involves taking a stand in regards of universal principles. This also means that, from the point of view of authenticity, we have to consider both levels of normativity: we must acknowledge (rather than restrain) the presence of urges which draw us away from our self-chosen principles, while still considering the moral aspects of our conduct.

### Concluding Remarks

This article departed on the assumption that in order to understand the contemporary status of the ideal of authenticity in Western societies, we need to pay attention to its roots. The normative grip of the ideal of authenticity builds on a long tradition of Western thought and practices, and in order to understand its contemporary constellations, the article focussed on the historical scaffolding of ideas from which this ideal has emerged, namely sincerity and autonomy. A contribution to a more profound understanding of authenticity sought to be achieved through defining it by contrasting it to sincerity and autonomy. The idea that the point of orientation that should guide the conduct and shape the path of life one chooses to take should come from a source within: those 'secret principles' that constitute one's core identity. This can be the first sign of the dispersion of the ideal of authenticity into popular culture, which was noticeable during the last two centuries, and is most striking in our contemporary society.

---

<sup>8</sup> Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 90

<sup>9</sup> Christoph Menke, "Innere Natur und soziale Normativität: Die Idee der Selbstverwirklichung" In: Hans Joas, Klaus Wiegandt (ed.), *Die kulturellen Werte Europas* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005), 304–352: 308

## References

- Anderson, Joel. "Review Essay: The Persistence of Authenticity", *Philosophy and Social Criticism* Vol. 21, no. 1, (1995), 101-109
- Augustine, *Confessions and Enchiridion*, ed. Albert Outler (*The Library of Christian Classics*, London: SCM Press, 1955)
- Despland, Michel. "Can Conscience Be Hypocritical? The Contrasting Analyses of Kant and Hegel", *The Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 68, No. 3/4 (Jul. - Oct., 1975), 357-370
- Dworkin, Gerald. *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988)
- Ferrara, Alessandro. *Modernity and Authenticity: A Study of the Social and Ethical Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Albany, NY: Sunny Press, 1993)
- Ferrara, Alessandro. *Reflective Authenticity* (London: Routledge, 1998)
- Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction*. (New York: Vintage Books 1980) (Transl. Robert Hurley)
- Guignon, Charles. *On Being Authentic* (London: Routledge, 2004)
- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *The Phenomenology of Mind* (London: Routledge, 2002)
- Honneth, Axel. „Schwerpunkt: Autonomie Authentizität“, *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, Vol. 42, Nr. 1 (1994), 59-60
- Menke, Christoph. "Innere Natur und soziale Normativität: Die Idee der Selbstverwirklichung" In: Hans Joas, Klaus Wiegandt (ed.), *Die kulturellen Werte Europas* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005), 304–352
- Menke, Christoph. *Tragödie im Sittlichen: Gerechtigkeit und Freiheit nach Hegel*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995)
- Nussbaum, Martha. *Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994)
- Pierre Hadot, "Reflections on the notion of the 'cultivation of the self'", in: Timothy J. Armstrong (ed.), *Michel Foucault, Philosopher* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 225-232
- Sartre, Jean-Paul. *Being and Nothingness*, Hazel E. Barnes, trans. (New York: Washington Square, [1943] 1966)
- Sennett, Richard. *The Conscience of the Eye: The Design and Social Life of Cities*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1993)
- Sennett, Richard. *The Corrosion of Character - The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*, (New York /London W.W. Norton & Company, 1998)
- Sheldrake, Philip F. "Christian Spirituality as a Way of Living Publicly: A Dialectic of the

Mystical and Prophetic", *Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality* Vol. 3, Nr. 1, (2003), 19-37

Taylor, Charles *The Ethics of Authenticity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991)

Trilling, Lionel. *Sincerity and Authenticity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972)

Weber, Max *Economy and Society*, Ed. By G. Roth and C. Wittich, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1968)

Williams, Bernard. *Truth and Truthfulness*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002)